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INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of the
juvenile death penalty seventeen years ago in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 1 and
held that executing offenders who committed crimes while under the age of
sixteen was unconstitutional. 2 One year later, in Stanford v. Kentucky, the
Court upheld the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty for youth
ages sixteen and seventeen. 3 The Court specifically noted that national
standards demonstrated that the public supported the death penalty for
sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds. 4 Despite these rulings, the Court
recently opted to reexamine the constitutionality of the juvenile death
penalty for sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.
In 2003, the Missouri Supreme Court held that the juvenile death penalty
1. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
2. See id. at 838 (concluding that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the
execution of such an individual).
3. See 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
4. See id. at 373 (suggesting that the “pattern of enacted laws” revealed no opposition
to the death penalty for sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds). But see Thompson, 487 U.S. at
822-29 (summarizing how state laws, jury behavior and decency standards indicate a
national consensus against executing fifteen-year-old criminal offenders).
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was unconstitutionally cruel and unusual under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments and reversed seventeen-year-old Christopher Simmons’ death
sentence. 5 Because the state court’s decision was contrary to the precedent
in Stanford, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 6 On March 1, 2005, the
Supreme Court decided the case in a landmark ruling, which affirmed the
decision of the Missouri Supreme Court and overruled the prior Supreme
Court decision in Stanford. 7
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In determining the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty, recent
cases 8 have questioned whether the practice constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 9 The state courts have the
power to make this determination under the Eighth Amendment, as applied
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 10
The Supreme Court provided the framework for analyzing the
constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty in two cases prior to Roper v.
Simmons. 11 In Thompson, the Court analyzed the constitutionality of the
juvenile death penalty by asking whether it comports with “evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” 12 The
Court set out a list of broad criteria to consider in determining current
national standards. 13 In deciding Thompson, the Court ultimately held that
the national consensus did not support the death penalty for those under the
age of sixteen. 14
5. See State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 413 (Mo. 2003) (en banc),
(explaining that the Supreme Court of the United States would draw a similar conclusion
after engaging in a similar legal analysis), aff’d, Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (2005).
6. See id., cert. granted, 540 U.S. 1160 (Jan. 26, 2004).
7. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1200 (2005), aff’g State ex rel. Simmons v.
Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
8. See, e.g., Stanford, 492 U.S. at 364-65; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 818-19.
9. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
10. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240-42 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(stating that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Eighth
Amendment by requiring courts to determine whether the death penalty is administered in
an inhumane [cruel] manner or applied unequally [unusual] by reason of race, religion, or
socio-economic factors).
11. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 361 (describing how the Court will determine whether the
death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 821-23 (listing the
criteria the Court reviews in ruling on the constitutionality of the death penalty).
12. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 821 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
13. See id. at 822 (listing state laws, jury behavior and current standards of decency as
some of the criteria that the Court will consider). The Court also examined various state
laws regarding the rights of fifteen-year-olds, the weight of public opinion as evidenced by
prominent national organizations such as the American Bar Association and the practice of
other developed nations around the world. Id. at 824-38.
14. See id. at 838.
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One year later, the Court faced the issue of the death penalty for sixteenThe Court upheld the
and seventeen-year-olds in Stanford. 15
constitutionality of the death penalty for these juvenile offenders, stating
that the only indicator to consider should be the law of each state. 16 These
different approaches to examining the constitutionality of the death penalty
have caused confusion as to what is the appropriate method of determining
the national consensus relating to the juvenile death penalty.
In the same year as Stanford, the Supreme Court ruled on the
constitutionality of executing a mentally retarded person in Penry v.
Lynaugh. 17 The Court applied the Thompson framework of determining
the national standards of decency and held that, based on the state laws in
effect, there was no national consensus against executing mentally retarded
offenders. 18 Thirteen years later, the Court again examined a case
challenging the constitutionality of executing mentally retarded individuals
in Atkins v. Virginia. 19 The Court reevaluated the national consensus and
found that based on state laws, the frequency with which the punishment
was used, opinions of national organizations and medical professionals, and
the current standards of decency, the death penalty for mentally retarded
individuals was unconstitutional, as it constituted cruel and unusual
punishment. 20 The Court’s ruling in Atkins raised the question as to what
extent national standards have changed such that the public consensus
would now object to the juvenile death penalty for those under age eighteen
at the time of commission of the crime.
II. FACTS
In September 1993, Christopher Simmons, then age seventeen, plotted
with two of his friends to commit burglary and murder. 21 On September 8,
1993, he and one other friend went to the home of Shirley Crook and
15. See 492 U.S. at 365-66 (recounting the facts of the two consolidated cases before
the Court, one involving a juvenile who committed his capital crime at age sixteen and the
other at age seventeen).
16. See id. at 377 (determining that the national consensus is best measured by looking
at the state and federal laws). The Court stated that including the opinion of national
organizations and others is not an accurate measure of public opinion and, rather, a dubious
foundation for constitutional law. Id.
17. 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (concluding that the Eighth Amendment does not
preclude the execution of a mentally retarded individual), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002).
18. See id. at 334 (noting that only two states prohibited the execution of mentally
retarded individuals).
19. See 536 U.S. at 304-11 (describing the case of Daryl Atkins, a mildly retarded man
sentenced to death for capital murder, abduction and armed robbery).
20. See id. at 315-16.
21. See State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165, 169-70 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (recounting
the details of the crime), habeas corpus granted by State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112
S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003), aff’d, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (2005).
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murdered her. 22 Two days later, police arrested Simmons and he confessed
to the crime. 23 A jury convicted him of first-degree murder and sentenced
him to death. 24
The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed Simmons’s conviction in 1997,
noting that the death penalty was not disproportionate when compared to
the penalties imposed in other cases. 25 Upon a writ of habeas corpus in
2003, the Missouri Supreme Court overturned Simmons’s conviction and
sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole. 26 The
judge stated that since the Supreme Court recently held the death penalty
unconstitutional for mentally retarded persons in Atkins, it was likely the
Court would now find the death penalty unconstitutional for juvenile
offenders who committed crimes when under the age of eighteen. 27 In
January 2004, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to reexamine the
constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty. 28
III. THE ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
To determine whether applying the death penalty to juveniles who were
under eighteen at the time of the offense is constitutional, the Supreme
Court examined the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society.” 29 More specifically, the Court reviewed the
national consensus relating to the issue and discussed whether, in its own
judgment, the punishment is disproportionate for juveniles. 30
A. Whether the National Consensus Supports Abolishing the
Juvenile Death Penalty for Offenders who Committed a
Crime When Under the Age of Eighteen
The Supreme Court concluded that a national consensus exists for the
abolition of the death penalty for offenders under eighteen-years-old at the
22. See id. (describing how the defendant and his friend entered the victim’s residence,
bound her and pushed her off of a railroad trestle into a river).
23. See id. at 170 (stating that Simmons even agreed to reenact the crime on videotape).
24. See id.
25. See id. at 191 (citing State v. Wilkins, 736 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. 1987) (en banc); State
v. Richardson, 923 S.W.2d 301 (Mo. 1996) (en banc)). Both cases involved sentencing
juvenile offenders to the death penalty. Id.
26. See Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 413.
27. See id. (suggesting that, under the “evolving standards of decency” analysis, the
U.S. Supreme Court would prohibit executing offenders convicted of committing a crime
under the age of eighteen).
28. State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003), cert. granted, Roper
v. Simmons, 540 U.S. 1160 (Jan. 26, 2004) (mem.).
29. Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1190 (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01).
30. See id. at 1192 (recognizing that the Court must reevaluate the factors for the
juvenile death penalty in this case, even though the framework appears similar to the
Stanford analysis).
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time of the crime. 31 Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Supreme Court
of Missouri utilized the analysis set forth in the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Atkins. 32 Justice Stevens, in announcing the opinion in Atkins,
reached the Court’s conclusion by examining the current legislative intent
across the country, the frequency with which states imposed capital
punishment, the opinion of national organizations, medical professionals,
and international laws and finally the proportionality of the death penalty in
light of today’s decency standards. 33
The Supreme Court noted the similarities between the present case and
Atkins regarding the national consensus. 34 The Court found that thirty
states prohibit the juvenile death penalty, which was the same number of
states that prohibited the execution of the mentally retarded when the Court
decided Atkins. 35 The Court also noted that, since its decision in Stanford,
only six states have executed juvenile offenders. 36 Additionally, in the
seminal Stanford case, the Governor of Kentucky spared Kevin Stanford’s
life, suggesting that the state should abolish its practice of sentencing
juvenile offenders to death. 37
While most indicia of national consensus proved to be similar between
Roper and Atkins, the Court noted that the change of the public’s opinion
for the abolition of the juvenile death penalty was occurring more slowly
than it did for the mentally retarded. 38 The Court attributed this difference
to the fact that many states already recognize the inappropriateness of
executing juvenile offenders by limiting the penalty to those over age
seventeen or eighteen. 39 Despite this slower progress toward abolition, the

31. See id. at 1194 (proposing that all “objective indicia” of a national consensus point
to a societal opposition to administering the juvenile death penalty).
32. See id. at 1192 (reasoning that the evidence in this case was analogous to the
evidence in the Atkins case and thus it was appropriate to use a similar analysis); see also
Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 407 (justifying the use of the Atkins approach because the same
factors the Court used in determining the constitutionality of the death penalty for the
mentally retarded also apply to the death penalty for juveniles).
33. See Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 404 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313).
34. See Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1192 (describing the evidence against the juvenile death
penalty as parallel to the evidence against the death penalty for the mentally retarded).
35. See id. (noting that twelve states reject the death penalty altogether, while eighteen
expressly prohibit juveniles from its application).
36. See id. (emphasizing that, in the past ten years, only three states have executed
juvenile offenders).
37. See id. (demonstrating that states have increasingly refused to acknowledge the
juvenile death penalty as a proportionate punishment).
38. See id. at 1193 (explaining that in the period between the two death penalty cases
involving the mentally retarded, Penry and Atkins, sixteen states that allowed executions for
mentally retarded offenders had abandoned the practice; whereas in the time between
Stanford and Roper, only five states had moved to prohibit the juvenile death penalty).
39. See id. (referencing the fact that at the time of Stanford, twelve states prohibited
execution of any juvenile under age eighteen, and fifteen states prohibited execution of
those under age seventeen).
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Court found the data compelling enough to conclude that the “consistency
of the direction of change” demonstrated that the juvenile death penalty
was phasing out of state criminal systems. 40
After conducting the analysis above, the Court determined that the
prohibition of the juvenile death penalty in a majority of states, the
infrequency of its use and the clear trend towards eliminating the practice
urged the conclusion that the national consensus supported abolition. 41
B. Whether the Juvenile Death Penalty Is a
Disproportionate Punishment
In assessing the proportionality of the death penalty to the crimes
juveniles commit, the Court explored when the death penalty should be
used under the Eighth Amendment. 42 The Court focused its analysis on the
maturity and intelligence of juvenile offenders, the purposes of the death
penalty, and whether executing juveniles serves the purposes behind the
punishment. 43
The Court discussed how the death penalty is an extreme punishment
deserving special attention under the Eighth Amendment. 44 An underlying
premise is that the states will apply the death penalty to a narrow group of
crimes and offenders. 45 The Court argued that juveniles cannot be
classified as the worst offenders, and should instead be excluded from this
narrow group to which the death penalty applies. 46 To the Court, juveniles
deserve special treatment because they lack maturity, make impulsive
decisions, are vulnerable to peer pressure and negative influences and lack
the character of fully-grown adults. 47 Guided by its decision in Thompson,
the Court concluded that the characteristics inherent to juveniles preclude

40. Id. (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315) (discussing the significance of the fact that no
death penalty state had lowered the minimum age, and that a group of states had chosen to
abandon the practice altogether).
41. See id. at 1194 (pointing to the evidence to show that juveniles deserve similar
treatment regarding the death penalty as the mentally retarded) (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at
316 (determining the evidence in that case made the mentally retarded “categorically less
culpable than the average criminal”)).
42. See id. at 1194-96 (reasoning why juveniles under the age of eighteen do not
deserve this severe of a punishment).
43. See id.
44. See id. at 1194 (observing that throughout Supreme Court jurisprudence, the
justices have held that states should only use the death penalty for the most serious crimes
and for the most reprehensible criminals).
45. See id. at 1195 (noting that the Court has previously held that states cannot sentence
certain groups of individuals to death, such as juveniles under sixteen, the criminally insane
and the mentally retarded).
46. See id. (listing the three differences between juvenile and adult offenders that makes
the death penalty cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment).
47. See id. (emphasizing that because of these differences, wrongful behavior on the
part of a juvenile is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult).
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the imposition of the death penalty to those under age eighteen. 48
The Court analyzed whether the desire for retribution or deterrence of
capital crimes justified imposing the death penalty on juveniles under
eighteen in order to determine the proportionality to the punishment. 49
Regarding retribution, the Court based its reasoning on its holding in Atkins
and posited that retribution was not proportional in juvenile death penalty
cases since the state would impose the punishment on someone who was
less culpable due to “youth and immaturity.” 50 The Court reached a similar
conclusion regarding the deterrent effect of the death penalty on
juveniles. 51 The Court noted that the lack of evidence proving a deterrent
effect amongst juveniles led to the conclusion that the effect was
insignificant. 52 Therefore, the Court determined that the social purposes of
retribution and deterrence do not provide justification for use of the death
penalty for those under eighteen. 53
In concluding that the juvenile death penalty is disproportionate for
offenders under eighteen, the Court also discussed how no other country
officially sanctions the practice except for the United States. 54 The Court
explained that establishing a bright line rule at age eighteen conforms to
society’s view of when a juvenile becomes an adult. 55
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The Supreme Court’s decision to abolish the juvenile death penalty
48. See id. at 1195-96 (arguing that juveniles have a greater chance of reforming
themselves); see also Thompson, 487 U.S. at 833-38 (stating that the punishment must be
proportionate to the personal culpability of the defendant and that juveniles are less culpable
than adult offenders due to their vulnerability and other traits inherent in youth).
49. See Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1196 (noting that given juveniles’ “diminished capacity” it
is less likely that the death penalty’s purposes will apply to juveniles in the same manner as
for adults).
50. See id. (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319).
51. See id. (citing Thompson, 487 U.S. at 837) (noting that juveniles are less susceptible
to deterrence than adults).
52. See id. (conceding that while the efficacy of a criminal penalty is usually reserved
for debate among the legislature, the absence of data is important here in inferring that
juveniles are unlikely to be deterred by this punishment).
53. See id. at 1196-97 (stressing that the Court cannot overlook the fact that many
juveniles commit brutal crimes, but finding that the brutality of a particular crime would not
outweigh the mitigating factor of a juvenile’s diminished capacity).
54. See id. (clarifying that while international law is not controlling when interpreting
the U.S. Constitution, the courts have considered it in determining what is “cruel and
unusual” under the Eighth amendment); see, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (noting the
international disapproval for the execution of mentally retarded people); Thompson, 487
U.S. at 830-31 (recognizing that other Western countries have abolished the juvenile death
penalty).
55. See Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1198 (noting that the Thompson Court drew the line for the
death penalty at sixteen without objection and, considering the changing standards of
decency, the Court held that the Thompson logic applied to raising the death penalty age to
eighteen).
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raises new questions of whether the Court will abolish the death penalty as
a whole. The Court’s analysis placed high value on the “evolving
standards of decency” as measured by criteria determining a national
consensus as well as the independent judgment of judges. Justice Scalia,
dissenting from this opinion, criticized this new approach to Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. 56
The Court’s ruling immediately affected pending and future cases
concerning the juvenile death penalty. 57 This decision vacated seventy-two
juvenile death sentences in over twelve states. 58 Moreover, many experts
view the Court’s analysis as an opportunity to go beyond the juvenile death
penalty and apply it to other special classes of people. 59 The Court may
find other characteristics of offenders or categories of crimes that may
further limit the use of the death penalty. 60
One aspect of the decision raises questions about future American
constitutional analysis. The Court noted that its decision conforms to
current international law. 61 Beyond the current issue of the juvenile death
penalty, the Court may refer to international law in resolving other
constitutional questions, a possibility which some justices find troubling. 62
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Roper v. Simmons is a significant step
toward the abolishment of the death penalty. The Court held that the

56. See id. at 1217 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (refusing to support the majority’s decision
because it does not rely on objective factors); see also Bill Mears, High Court: Juvenile
Death Penalty Unconstitutional (Mar. 1, 2005) (detailing Scalia’s opinion that the analysis
in the Roper case was nothing more than the personal views of the justices and a “snapshot
of
American
public
opinion
at
a
particular
point
in
time”),
at
http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/03/01/scotus.death.penalty/index.html.
57. See Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1198 (explaining that Stanford is no longer good law and
cannot be relied upon to carry out executions).
58. See Mark Hansen, Ruling May Spur New Death Penalty Challenges: Abolition
Unlikely, But Experts See Limits to Capital Punishment for Other Groups, 4 ABA J.
EREPORT 9 (March 4, 2005) (reporting that the Roper decision also prohibits the twenty
states that allow juvenile executions from imposing such sentences), at
http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/m4sct.html.
59. See id. (stating that the reasoning of the Court opens the door to claims by
“[eighteen to twenty]-year-olds, minorities, the mentally ill, foreign nationals and other
classes of people”).
60. See id. (suggesting that it is possible that the death penalty will be further restricted,
but that the current composition of the Court makes it unlikely that it will be abolished).
61. See Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1198 (explaining that only the United States officially
sanctioned the juvenile death penalty).
62. See id. at 1225-26 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court cited to international
treaties and conventions that the U.S. President has not yet signed nor has the Senate
ratified). Contra id. at 1215-16 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (suggesting the Court has
referred to international law over the past fifty years in previous decisions relating to the
Eighth Amendment and that the Court derives value in knowing that their rulings comport
with standards of decency prevailing in other countries).
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juvenile death penalty for offenders who were older than fifteen but
younger than eighteen at the time of the commission of the crime is
impermissible under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Constitution as cruel and unusual punishment. The Court’s decision opens
up the possibility for other classes of offenders to propose more limitations
to the death penalty in the future, potentially leading to a complete
abolition of the practice.
JENNIFER ESWARI BORRA
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